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Introduction
From the beginning, grazing on public lands has been controversial. However, recently
there has been considerable public debate regarding grazing leases and the fees charged
on these leases. The original grazing policy was modeled by special interest groups and
legislators. Recent suggested changes to grazing policy are no different. Unfortunately,
arguments behind these proposed changes may not be based on solid evidence, but rather
on emotion and special interest. Consequently, the purpose of this study is to further
explore the intrinsic value of grazing leases and the effect on lease values caused by the
current political climate. Using hedonic modeling, we will test the hypothesis that
attributes contributing to ranch values have changed over time due to changing market
conditions and the changing political climate.
Recently, the Clinton Administration and the U.S. Department of Interior have
proposed new land use reforms that also propose higher grazing lease rates. Proponents
for increased grazing fees and more restrictive grazing permits argue that public lands
should have increased availability for multiple use. They also argue that permits that
authorize the use of federal or state land for grazing do not compensate taxpayers for
their reduced access to these lands nor do current grazing fees compensate taxpayers for
the full market value of the forage produced on public lands.
Opponents to proposed land use reform and higher grazing lease rates argue that any
increase in grazing fees will severely affect the ranching industry by reducing operating
incomes, forcing ranchers and their families out of business and decreasing ranch values.
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Abstract.  Using Wyoming ranch sales from 1979–1983 and 1989–1993, this study
investigates how ranch value determining attributes may have changed over this period. The
1979–1983 period is one of political stability and rising prices. In contrast, the 1989–1993
period is one of political uncertainty but stable prices. It is found, during 1989–1993, ranch
prices were based more on productivity; whereas, during the earlier period, prices were
based more on speculative potential. Also, it is found that government grazing leases were
valued differently between time periods, ecological regions and types of leases. This
suggests that the current single-price grazing fee commonly used misprices many leases.
Because of the heterogeneity in the value of grazing leases, we recommend a variable-fee
form of pricing be adopted.These arguments and others that are currently being heard in Washington and across
the West may already have had a detrimental effect on ranch values. To estimate the effect
of the current political climate on ranch values and on the attributes contributing to
ranch values, this study uses ranch sales data in Wyoming from 1979 through 1983, and
1989 through 1993.
During the period from 1979 through 1983, ranch values generally were increasing and
the political climate regarding rangeland reform and grazing leases was rather stable. The
Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 called for grazing leases to be set at
market value after a phase-in period; however, the Federal Land Policy and Management
Act and Grazing Fee Moratorium of 1977 amended the 1976 act to prevent imple-
mentation of the recommended procedures for the 1978 grazing year on the basis that
Congress would not otherwise have a reasonable opportunity to examine the recom-
mendation of the 1976 act. As a result, the Public Range Improvement Act (PRIA) of
1978 was enacted. This act provided a formula for setting annually a single grazing fee for
BLM and Forest Service leases. The PRIA formula derives a grazing fee per animal unit
month (AUM) of public forage through the use of three indices and a base fee.1 The
indices vary from year to year and reﬂect values of private forage land lease rates (Forage
Value Index), beef cattle prices (Beef Cattle Price Index) and costs of beef production
(PRIA Prices Paid Index). The base fee of $1.23 was established by the 1966 Western
Livestock Grazing Survey which used the total cost approach to fee evaluation
(USDA/USDI, 1993). With the use of this formula the grazing fee could be changed
annually. Originally the PRIA formula was adopted for a seven-year trial period. A
federal grazing fee study published in 1986 found that fees set under the PRIA formula
were substantially less than private land lease rates negotiated in competitive markets
(USDA/USDI, 1986). Nevertheless, a 1986 Executive Order mandated that federal land
grazing fees continue to be set using the PRIA formula. Even though there has been
almost yearly debate in Washington regarding grazing fees, the PRIA formula is still in
effect.
During the 1989–1993 period, in contrast to the earlier 1979–1983 period, there was
much controversy over federal grazing fees. For example, in 1991 there was a serious
attempt to raise BLM (Bureau of Land Management) rates from the then-current $1.97
per AUM to $8.70, or more, per AUM by 1995. The defeat of this bill was engineered
only through an agreement with conservative western lawmakers to help defeat an
amendment sponsored by Sen. Jesse Helms that would have prohibited the National
Endowment for the Arts from funding projects that depicted ‘‘in a patently offensive way,
sexual or excretory activities or organs.’’ This deal has since been dubbed ‘‘Corn for
Porn.’’ Similar attempts to raise grazing fees again failed in 1992 and 1993 (Sunderman
and Spahr, 1994).
During the early years of this study (1979–1983), ranch values increased substantially
(see Rowan and Workman, 1992). However, after 1983, there was a dramatic decrease in
ranch values. Inﬂation during the late 1970s and early 1980s alone cannot explain the
dramatic increase in land values but does partially explain investment strategies during
this period. Expectations of continued land appreciation provided incentives for land
investment and speculation. These expectations were fulﬁlled for a short period until the
beginning of the decline in ranch values in 1983. On the other hand, ranch prices seem to
be much more stable during the later years of this study (1989–1993).
This study has a number of objectives. We will investigate the value of each attribute
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values increased, and during the more recent time period, subperiod 1989 through 1993,
when ranch values were more stable but during which political uncertainty was present
due to the threat of rangeland reform and substantially higher lease fees. One of the
attributes evaluated is the effect that the availability of grazing leases has on ranch values.
Speciﬁcally, the effect of the availability of BLM, Forest Service, State of Wyoming and
private leases on ranch sales prices will be evaluated for both the earlier years and for the
later years. It is hypothesized that by observing the earlier years, with relative political
certainty but rapidly increasing ranch values, and later years, with more stable ranch
values but more political uncertainty, the intrinsic value of public grazing leases may be
more accurately assessed. Also, by observing these two subperiods, we may determine the
change in the value of ranch attributes that may have resulted from the changing market.
We also will investigate the homogeneity of public lands with respect to quality and
productivity and assess the propriety of the current federal practice of setting a single
grazing fee.
Description and Previous Work
In Wyoming, as well as many western states, ranches are likely to consist of deeded
property and accompanying grazing leases or permits on federal or state land. When
ranches are sold, it is common practice for public grazing leases to be transferred along
with the deeded property. A public grazing lease or permit may have value since it is
commonly accepted that grazing leases or permits rent for a lower price than comparable
private leases or rent for less than their face market value. It has been theorized that part
of the difference between the fees charged and the value of the forage at the allowable
limit is capitalized into the value of the base property (Hooper, 1967). This premium has
become known as the ‘‘permit value’’.
Fees for grazing livestock on public lands were ﬁrst assessed in 1906 by the United
States Forest Service. The BLM assessed its ﬁrst fees for forage use in 1936. Grazing fees
were implemented to provide these agencies with an income base to cover the
administrative cost of public land management (Hooper, 1967). In addition, laws and
policies used to govern lands leased by the states, the BLM and the Forest Service were
designed to help promote the stability of family ranches, and the economies they help
support (USDA/USDI, 1986).
Permits that authorize the use of federal or state lands for ranching were ﬁrst issued
free-of-charge for the purposes of developing and settling the vast areas of the western
states’ public lands, since at that time there were no competing uses for these lands
(Nielsen, 1972). Each permit speciﬁes an appropriate number of livestock allowed to
graze on the public land as measured in Animal Units (AUs). Animal Units may be
further broken down into Animal Unit Months (AUMs), which deﬁne the amount of
forage needed to sustain a one-thousand-pound cow with calf, a horse, or ﬁve sheep for
one month’s time (U.S. GOA, 1992).
The current public debate regarding land use reforms and higher grazing lease rates
may be categorized into a few different points of view. Proponents for increased grazing
fees and restrictive grazing permits argue that federal and state agencies are not collecting
full market values for public forage land, and public lands should have increased
availability for multiple use. The debate regarding the level of fees that should be charged
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be implemented is largely fueled by three conﬂicting viewpoints.
One view holds that federal and state agencies are not collecting full market value for
livestock grazing on public lands as directed by the Federal Land and Policy Manage-
ment Act of 1976 (Martin and Jefferies, 1966; Torell and Fowler, 1986; Collins and
Constantino, 1990; Sunderman and Spahr, 1994). These studies conclude that a premium
for control of the grazing permit, permit value, is capitalized into the sale price of
ranches. This permit value on public lands administered by federal and state agencies is a
direct result of grazing lease rates on public lands being set below rates found in the
private marketplace, or less than their fair market value. Nielsen (1972) concludes, ‘‘As
long as ranchers are willing to pay each other for grazing permits, the government is not
getting full market value in fees.’’ Those holding this ﬁrst viewpoint urge that the Federal
Land and Policy Management Act of 1976 be strenuously implemented so the
government will receive the full market value of its grazing land leases.
A second view holds that federal and state agencies should not recognize capitalized
permit values since ranch sales accompanied by grazing permits are private transactions
in their entirety. Currently, these agencies do not place a stated value on these capitalized
permit values. Torell and Doll (1991) estimate that 85% to 90% of ranches with grazing
rights to public lands have transferred ownership since the original permits were issued.
Those holding this view urge federal and state agencies to refuse to recognize that
permittees who have purchased ranches with grazing permits have paid a capitalized
premium for those forage rights, thereby effectively ignoring the existence of permit
values.
A third view assumes that public grazing lands are a public resource and should be
managed from a societal perspective. Its proponents hold that an appropriate resolution
for the grazing fee issue is to implement a competitive bidding system. Nielsen (1972)
claims that the competitive bidding process elevates public bids to the marginal value
product of the forage used in livestock production. The competitive bidding processes
would most efﬁciently achieve the goal of collecting full market value for the
government.
Opponents argue that any increase in grazing fees will severely affect the ranching
industry by reducing the level of operating income, forcing ranchers and their families
out of business and decreasing the value of ranch lands. Lambert (1987) in an analysis of
northeastern Nevada ranches concludes that a public lands grazing fee increase from the
1985 Bureau of Land Management federal lease rate of $1.35 per AUM to the average
1985 private land lease rate of $8.40 per AUM would reduce mean net ranch revenues
from $7.72 per AUM to $3.99 per AUM. Additionally, he estimates that ranch values
would fall from $134.25 per AUM to $92.08 per AUM. Torell, Garrett and Ching (1981)
also found similar results.
A similar argument for not raising lease rates is that ranch owners pay capitalized
premiums on these leasehold interests in the form of property and inheritance taxes
assessed on the capital values of the base property (Hooper, 1967). Thus, ranchers who
currently control public grazing permits will be paying for these leasehold interests twice
if grazing fees are increased.
Another argument often raised for eliminating the current grazing practices has been
that the current system results in ranchers being subsidized by the government. This
argument has a major ﬂaw as pointed out by Hooper (1967) and Roberts (1963). It is true
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fees may have received windfall gains when their ranches were sold. However, when the
original ranches were sold at an arm’s-length price, the new buyers will have paid a
competitive risk-adjusted price for the privilege of grazing on public land. Thus, no
federal subsidy will have been received by new owners. Given that premiums were paid
for acquiring public grazing rights under the assumption of continuing preferential
leasing practices, then if the longstanding preferred right of renewal is revoked or rental
rates are set at a competitive market rate, the original premium paid for grazing rights
may be lost. Even though this would affect only the current lease holders, it could be
argued that this alternative is unfair and may make it difﬁcult for some ranchers to
remain in business (Lambert, 1987).
It has been established that the rates of private forage leases are greater than the rates
of public forage leases (USDA/USDI, 1993; Obermiller and Lambert, 1984). This
observed discrepancy in lease rates may be attributed to factors such as the lessees’ higher
costs of upkeep of public rangelands, the differences in quality of the rangelands, the cost
of lost or killed livestock on public rangelands, and the uncertainty of the outcome of the
grazing fees debate.
Grazing fees may take two different forms, a single-fee form in which one fee is
assessed for all lands administered by a federal or state agency regardless of land quality
or productivity or a variable-fee form where assessed fees vary for each permit or
geographical region. The BLM and the Forest Service currently use the single-fee form of
assessment based on the fee calculation formula outlined by the Public Range
Improvement Act (PRIA) of 1978 (Sunderman and Spahr, 1994). The State of Wyoming
also relies on a single-fee form of assessment.
The single-fee form grazing fee has been widely criticized by those who believe that it
is an inequitable way to assess grazing fees. The opponents of the single-fee form argue
that not all land is equal in productivity or regional value and should not be assessed as
though it were equal (McCarl and Brokken, 1985). By using the single-fee form grazing
fee assessment, the resulting forage value estimates will be broad averages that may
impute excessive amounts of variation into the estimated value of the grazing permit
(Nielsen, 1972).
Regardless of the criticism of a single-fee form of grazing fee, it remains the method
used by the federal government and most states. However, the quality and productivity of
public lands administered by federal and state agencies are not uniform throughout the
country, nor are these public lands completely uniform in any one western state. The
State of Wyoming is a prime example of this nonuniformity due to its many ecological
regions. Conversely, assessing a single uniform rate for use of these public lands for
grazing may result either in overcharging or in undercharging of the users.
In offering an amicable solution to the grazing fees debate, Nielsen (1972) suggests
that permittees be stratiﬁed into grazing fee market areas having more homogeneous
total operating costs. What Nielsen suggests can also be applied to grazing fee market
areas having more homogeneous quality and productivity characteristics. Previous
studies by Nielsen (1972), Collins (1983), McCarl and Brokken (1985), Sunderman and
Spahr (1994), Spahr, Sunderman and Jones (1994), and others have observed the
existence of heterogeneity in grazing leases and have stressed the inapplicability of using
the single-fee form of grazing fees. However, a USDA/USDI (1993) study, which includes
the State of Wyoming as one of its three test states, recommended that fees for forage on
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form grazing fee assessment. The USDA/USDI study stated:
Differences among ranching areas, as shown by the data, were not large enough
in relation to the wide variation that existed within areas to provide a basis for
recommending differential base fees among ranching areas.2
According to this USDA/USDI study, the forage within the State of Wyoming is
regionalized into clustered intrastate allotments based on seven ecoregions representing a
composite set of ecological boundaries identiﬁed by differences in soil, vegetation,
landform, climate, and use.3 Wyoming also covers three pricing areas established on the
basis of political boundaries, economic regions, ecological regions, or some combination
thereof with the state.4
Data and Hedonic Models
Permits for livestock grazing on federal and state lands, with few exceptions, may only be
transferred through the sale of land, water or livestock. As a result, a permit value
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Kansasreﬂecting the cost advantage of leasing lands for grazing from federal and state agencies
is imputed into the sale prices of the ranch when sold. Consequently, the sale price is
speciﬁed as the dependent variable in all models.
The data consists of two sets. One set contains 128 ranch sales from ﬁve counties in the
State of Wyoming for January 1979 to December 1983. The second set consists of 130
ranch sales from the same ﬁve counties in Wyoming between January 1989 and June
1993.5 Further, the data used in this study come from either Ecoregion 8 or 9. Even
though the State of Wyoming covers three pricing areas, the data from this study all fall
in pricing area 3.6
For the purposes of this study, ranches with less than 100 deeded acres are omitted
from the data set, because in all practical circumstances ranches with less than 100
deeded acres are not purchased for livestock production, but as hobby ranches. Also,
ranches with grazing permits for forage lands in other states are eliminated from the data
set. Non-arm’s-length sales, as well as any sales that are viewed as stress, were also
deleted. Other deletions are made because of incomplete data for individual ranch sales.
The forage (in AUMs) to be valued within the State of Wyoming is divided into two
groups, deeded forage and leased forage. The broad category of deeded forage comprises
lands that are strictly purchased and owned by the rancher.
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Exhibit 2
Map of Pricing Areas
Source: USDA/USDI, 1993In many observations, sale price includes permanent improvements such as buildings
and equipment essential to the operation of the ranch. When improvements were
included in the sale, the land appraiser made an estimate of the dollar value of additional
real property that was included in the sale price. Rather than deducting real property
from the sale price and using this adjusted price as the dependent variable, it was decided
to include the value for real property (REAL) as an explanatory variable. By doing so, it
is possible to statistically test the accuracy of the value placed on improvements by land
appraisers and how improvements affect the sale price of a ranch. To examine whether
these real property improvements are valued by potential buyers differently between
ecoregions, two additional variables are created. These variables REAL8 and REAL9 are
created by multiplying REAL by either a zero or one dummy variable for each ecoregion.
As a result, REAL8 represents real property on ranches in Ecoregion 8 and REAL9
represents real property on ranches in Ecoregion 9.
Explanatory variables were selected to incorporate and control for the income-
producing ability of the ranch, location differences and changes in market conditions.
Results from previous studies and the availability of data also inﬂuenced the selection of
explanatory variables.7
Hedonic models were selected to estimate the effect that various attributes had on the
market price of a particular ranch. A linear functional form model is chosen because it is
easier to interpret the coefﬁcients for the explanatory variables.
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BLM3AM Section 3 BLM Grazing Lease AUMs
BLM15AM Section 15 BLM Grazing Lease AUMs
STATEAM State Lease AUMs
USFSAM Forest Service Grazing Permit AUMs
PRRAM Private Lease AUMs
REAL $ of Real Property Included in Sale
UG Dummy Variable for Ranches with Little or No Scenic and/or
Recreational Value
OK Dummy Variable for Ranches with Average Scenic and/or
Recreational Value
GOOD Dummy Variable for Ranches with High Scenic and/or
Recreational Value
DUG UG * Deeded Acres
DOK OK * Deeded Acres
DGOOD GOOD * Deeded Acres
IRRAM AUMs on Irrigated Land
B79, B80, B81, B82, B83, and B84 Weighted time variable for the beginning of the year listed.
These variables are for the data from 1979–1983. B79 is
excluded from the regressions as the base period.
B89, B90, B91, B92, B93, and B94 Weighted time variable for the beginning of the year listed.
These variables are for the data from 1989–1993. B89 is
excluded from the regressions as the base period.The time (date-of-sale) variable as it is incorporated in the model controls for the fact
that market prices of ranches may not have been stable throughout the time period of this
study.8 The form used for the date-of-sale variable was suggested by Bryan and Colwell
(1982). Each date of sale is deﬁned as a linear combination of the end-points of the year
in which the sale occurs. Date-of-sale variables, B(y), are the proportionate weights.
There is a date-of-sale variable for each year in which sales occurred. For example,
suppose a sale occurred in September 1990, then B90 is 0.25, B91 is 0.75 and all other
B(y) variables are zero. Since the sale was closer to the beginning of 1991 than to the
beginning of 1990, B91 is larger and given more weight than B90. This approach allows
the rate of change in prices to be different for each year and allows for a price continuum
rather than a step function. Since our desire was not to build a price index but rather to
control for the market changes, this approach was chosen.9
Public grazing leases consist of Section 3 (Taylor Grazing Act) BLM land (BLM3AM),
Section 15 (Taylor Grazing Act) BLM land (BLM15AM), State of Wyoming leases
(STATEAM), U.S. Forest Service leases (USFSAM), and private leases (PRRAM). Each
of these variables reﬂect the number of animal unit months of grazing allowed or available.
Section 3 BLM leases generally consist of larger acreages or tracts of land that may
represent an interest in a grazing association or at least represent a larger scale. Section 15
BLM leases generally consist of those tracts that are interspersed among a ranch’s deeded
acres. Many times these Section 15 tracts were lands that were not homesteaded or
purchased from the federal government. These tracts usually have the least desirable
terrain and usually contain little water. Thus, it is hypothesized that these two types of
BLM leases will represent leases with different levels of intrinsic desirability.
To test the relative homogeneity or heterogeneity of government grazing  leases
between Ecoregion 8 and Ecoregion 9, each of the above government leasing variables
(BLM3AM,  BLM15AM, STATEAM, and USFSAM) are multiplied by either a
zero or one dummy variable for each ecoregion. These variables are BLM3AM8,
BLM15AM8, STATEAM8, and USFSAM8 for ranches located in Ecoregion 8 and
BLM3AM9, BLM15AM9, STATEAM9, and USFSAM9 for ranches located in
Ecoregion 9. Thus, the coefﬁcient for each of these variables in the hedonic model will
represent the value of these respective government grazing leases per AUM for their
respective ecoregions.
In addition to variables that reﬂect the productive value of ranches sold, three dummy
variables were used to address the difference in scenic or recreation value for all ranches
in the data set. These scenic dummy variables were subsequently multiplied by the
number of deeded acres for each ranch sold. Variables DUG, DOK and DGOOD
represent ranches with very little, average and substantial scenic and/or recreational
value, respectively. These variables were assigned with the aid of professional appraisers
who work for Farm Credit Services. The purpose of these variables is to determine the
value placed on ranches with high levels of scenic and/or recreational value as compared
to ranches with little, if any, such value. It should be noted that ranches in Ecoregion 9
tend to have higher scenic and/or recreational value because, as deﬁned, these ranches are
located in the mountains of southern Wyoming.
The ﬁnal variable in both Models 1 and 2 represents the AUM of production for
ranches in Ecoregion 8 or 9 associated with irrigated hay or pasture. These variables
IRRAM8 and IRRAM9 represent the adjustment to the value for DAUM8 and DAUM9,
respectively, that irrigated hay or grazing has on the base value per DAUM.
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Referring to Exhibit 4, it is apparent that both Models 1 and 2 applied to both the
1979–83 and the 1989–93 data represent good ﬁts with adjusted R2 values in the high .9s.
Model 1 and 2 are both linear models where it is assumed that each ranch attribute (see
Exhibit 3) contributes in a linear manner to the ranch sales price. The difference between
Model 1 and 2 is the treatment of deeded animal unit months (DAUM). Model 1 uses
DAUM across the entire sample, thus representing the average value for all ranches sold
in each of the two time periods. Alternatively, Model 2 multiplies a zero-one dummy
variable for each of the two ecoregions by DAUM to create DAUM8 and DAUM9. These
variables estimate the contribution that a DAUM has to ranch values in each of the two
ecoregions. Further, to allow for the comparison of the coefﬁcients between models, the
models have been estimated where the intercept is forced through the origin. This makes
it possible to observe the actual change in value of these different ranch attributes across
these two time periods.
Model 1 suggests that the average contribution to the value of a ranch for DAUM
during the 1979–83 time period was $112.19 and $260.85 during 1989–93. Using Model
2 it is observed that the value of a DAUM8 was $232.27 during the 1979–83 time period
and $242.61 during the 1989–93 period. Perhaps not a surprise is the value for DAUM9
during 1979–83. The value was not statistically signiﬁcant or approximately zero.
Conversely, in 1989–93 the value of DAUM9 was estimated at $186.86.
This may be explained by the nature of the market for ranch land during the 1979–83
time period. As previously explained above, Rowan and Workman (1992), as well as
anyone associated with ranch and farm land prices, realized that during the 1979–83 time
period expectation of continued land appreciation provided incentives for land
investment and speculation. Apparently, for ranches in the mountains of southern
Wyoming the speculation on ranches in this region was at a level that ranches sold mainly
on the basis of their scenic and/or recreation value and not on the basis of their
productivity.
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Exhibit 4
Dependent Variable5PRICE
Model 1 Model 1 Model 2 Model 2
Variable 1979–1983 1989–1993 1979–1983 1989–1993
DAUM 112.194 260.846 — —
(3.022) (8.189) — —
DAUM8 — — 232.271 242.608
(6.137) (7.348)
DAUM9 — — 227.005 186.856
(2.682) (3.668)
BLM3AM8 27.979 58.860 64.202 59.672
(1.769) (1.732) (4.290) (1.775)
BLM3AM9 214.246 265.404 220.360 22.510
(2.706) (2.431) (3.212) (.143)
BLM15AM8 215.853 15.017 210.135 3.000
(2.453) (.808) (2.334) (.154)GOVERNMENT GRAZING LEASES, RANCH VALUES 611
BLM15AM9 292.938 240.359 42.928 107.841
(2.479) (.642) (.253) (1.063)
STATEAM8 74.098 35.945 270.562 30.175
(1.238) (.862) (21.234) (.730)
STATEAM9 2248.393 59.005 212.779 163.235
(21.727) (.547) (20.098) (1.353)
USFSAM — 181.160 — 169.425
(2.003) (1.890)
USFSAM8 148.057 — 135.071 —
(2.941) (3.093)
USFSAM9 311.440 — 239.445 —
(2.040) (1.803)
PRRAM 288.087 175.484 293.034 291.401
(21.661) (.362) (22.025) (.603)
REAL8 3.054 2.965 2.736 2.923
(5.272) (5.951) (5.423) (5.924)
REAL9 4.469 4.248 5.340 4.130
(8.571) (3.830) (11.253) (3.759)
DUG 42.408 232.414 10.895 225.889
(3.279) (23.554) (.881) (22.673)
DOK 76.792 213.052 84.165 .443
(3.869) (21.197) (4.882) (.034)
DGOOD 91.732 12.611 69.099 18.305
(3.549) (1.276) (3.043) (1.787)
IRRAM8 226.167 2232.047 2164.311 2213.479
(2.523) (25.259) (23.348) (24.767)
IRRAM49 221.328 2178.176 113.068 294.320
(2.562) (25.525) (2.846) (21.701)
B80 81576 — 98452 —
(1.105) (1.537)
B81 75478 — 81044 —
(1.064) (1.318)
B82 98486 — 154110 —
(1.412) (2.521)
B83 35871 — 25646 —
(.490) (.404)
B84 30238 — 216821 —
(.273) (2.175)
B90 — 27197.427 — 217973
(2.130) (2.326)
B91 — 60648 — 65234
(1.594) (1.730)
B92 — 131928 — 125764
(3.080) (2.960)
B93 — 171964 — 168757
(3.248) (3.221)
B94 — 55301 — 34030
(.222) (.138)
Adjusted R2 .9753 .9693 .9815 .9700
No. of observations 128 130 128 130A second attribute of sale price is the value of real improvements on the ranch. Farm
Credit Services appraisers have estimated the contribution that real improvements have
on the value of each ranch; thus our measure of the effect that these real improvements
have on ranch prices is relative. A coefﬁcient of one for real improvements, REAL,
suggests that the appraiser is correct in his estimate of value added. For the 1979–83 time
period, looking at Model 1 and 2 in Exhibit 4, the relative value of REAL8 was
approximately 2.90 for Ecoregion 8, which contains less scenic ranches, whereas for
Ecoregion 9, which contains more scenic ranches, the relative value of real improvements
was approximately 4.90.10 This suggests that real improvements during the 1979–83 time
period on ranches with little or no scenic value represented approximately one-half the
relative contribution toward sale price as compared to Ecoregion 9 or the more scenic
ranches. During the 1989–93 time period, the relative value of REAL8 was approximately
2.94 whereas the relative value of real property in Ecoregion 9 was approximately 4.19.
Again, for 1989–93, the relative value placed on the value of real property was
substantially higher for ranches in Ecoregion 9 than for those in Ecoregion 8.
Another attribute that displays an interesting contribution to ranch values is the value
of AUMs contributed by irrigated hay or grazing, IRRAM. This variable also represents
the relative availability of water on the ranch. IRRAM8 and IRRAM9 represent irrigated
AUMs in Ecoregions 8 and 9, respectively.
During both the 1979–83 and 1989–93 time periods, ranches in Ecoregion 8
demonstrated that sale price is reduced by the availability of irrigation. This appears to
be contradictory as there is a saying in Wyoming that ‘‘water is everything.’’ However, as
explained by a Farm Credit Services appraiser, this is an obvious result because putting
up hay and irrigating is ‘‘damned hard work and expensive.’’ It is much less work and less
expensive to generate AUMs on a ranch by having more acres of grazing land than to
generate these same AUMs by irrigation. On the other hand, it appears that ranches in
Ecoregion 9 placed a positive value on irrigated AUMs during the 1979–83 period, but
during 1989–93, the value added to DAUM because of irrigation was negative. This
suggests that during the 1979–83 time period, ranch purchasers paid a premium for
irrigated AUMs; whereas, by 1989–93, they valued irrigated AUMs more similarly with
ranches in Ecoregion 8. This, again, suggests that ranches sold during the 1989–93 period
placed more value on productivity than during the previous subperiod.
The primary objective of this study is to investigate the value of grazing leases that
accompany the sale of a ranch and determine their relative homogeneity or heterogeneity.
As expected, the value of private leases, PRRAM, that accompanied the sale of a ranch
have negative, if any, effect on ranch sale prices. In both models in Exhibit 4, the
coefﬁcient for PRRAM is not statistically signiﬁcant or is statistically signiﬁcant and
negative. During the 1979–83 time period, the availability of private leases reduced the
value of a ranch signiﬁcantly; whereas during the 1989–93 time period the effect on ranch
values was statistically insigniﬁcant from zero. This observation is to be expected if we
assume that most private leases are priced at or near their intrinsic value. Also, many
private leases result from a third party owning a ranch or parcel in the same vicinity of
the selling ranch. This person usually does not actively engage in ranching, thus desires
to gain some return through leasing. The existence of these parcels, if grazing is priced at
market, will, at best, add no value to the selling ranch or, more likely, will reduce the sale
price of the selling ranch due to the inconvenience of the private lease.
BLM Section 3 (BLM3AM) and BLM Section 15 (BLM15AM) leases appear to affect
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Ecoregion 8 (BLM3AM8), using Model 2, were worth approximately $64 per AUM;
whereas, Section 3 grazing leases for Ecoregion 9 (BLM15AM9), again using Model 2,
were valued at approximately $220. During the 1989–93 period the value of these leases
for Ecoregion 8 was approximately $59 per AUM; whereas, the value of Section 3 leases
in Ecoregion 9 was not statistically signiﬁcant from zero. The permit value for Section 15
BLM leases was not statistically signiﬁcant from zero for both subperiods and for both
ecoregions.
Using a real discount rate of 3.32%,11 would suggest that the annual permit value of
Section 3 leases for the 1979–83 period in Ecoregion 8 was $2.12 and for Ecoregion 9 was
$7.30; whereas, the most recent time period reﬂected a permit value for Ecoregion 8 of
$1.96 and zero for Ecoregion 9.12 As is obvious, Section 15 leases had a zero permit value
for both subperiods.
U.S. Forest Service leases (USFSAM) appear to add signiﬁcantly more to the sale price
of a ranch than other federal leases. During the 1979–83 time period, Ecoregion 8
ranches accompanied by U.S. Forest Service leases increased in price by approximately
$142 per AUM. Alternatively, ranches in Ecoregion 9 increased in sale price by
approximately $275 per AUM of Forest Service lease.
Because of a lack of data, USFSAM were not broken down by ecoregion for the
1989–93 period. However, the value of these leases for both ecoregions was approxi-
mately $180 per AUM which represents an annual permit value of approximately $5.98.
The fourth type of public lease is State of Wyoming land. To a considerable extent,
land owned by the State of Wyoming in the ﬁve counties included in this study represent
the two school sections in each township deeded to the state to support public education.
For both the 1979–83 and 1989–93 time periods, the contribution to sale price of State
AUMs is statistically insigniﬁcant for both models in Ecoregion 8; however, for Model 1
and Ecoregion 9, the value was negative and statistically signiﬁcant for the 1979–83 time
period. This result is not found in Model 2 for Ecoregion 9. Thus, the availability of State
of Wyoming grazing leases with the sale of deeded ranches at best has no impact on the
sale price and at worst, has a negative effect on the price. Thus, current lease rates on
State lands are either at the appropriate level or slightly high.
The existence of very high adjusted R2 terms in all the hedonic models reported has
caused concern for the authors. High adjusted R2 may result from high levels of
multicollinearity or from the fact that data is accurately reported and the market for
ranch prices is quite efﬁcient. To test which alternative is correct, we have included a
variance inﬂation factor test, VIF, for each attribute in each model. A variance inﬂation
factor (VIF) exceeding 10 is often considered as an indication that multicollinearity may
be inﬂuencing the least squares estimates.13 For both models, VIF values in excess of 10
were found for only DAUM8, DAUM9, IRRAM8, IRRAM9 and DUG. All other VIF
values were less than 10. Also, if IRRAM variables were deleted from the model, VIF
values were less than 10 for all attributes. Thus, it is our conclusion that multicollinearity
is not the cause of high adjusted R2 values.
Conclusions
This study has analyzed ranch sales data from ﬁve counties in Wyoming for two separate
subperiods, 1979–83 and 1989–93. These two subperiods were chosen because the market
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subperiod. The 1979–83 subperiod was rather calm politically with regard to grazing leases;
however, ranch prices were increasing and high during this time. Alternatively, during the
1989–93 subperiod, ranch values were more stable; however, there existed a great amount
of uncertainty regarding the future cost and availability of federal grazing leases.
The general trend from the earlier subperiod to the latter subperiod is that deeded
animal unit months (the measure of a ranch’s productivity) had more effect on the sale
price of ranches in latter years. Thus, subsequent to the market correction in the mid-
1980s, it is observed that ranches in the 1990s sell for prices effectively based on
productivity. Adding to this perception are ranches containing recreation and/or scenic
value. Based on Model 2, these ranches during the 1989–93 time period sold for
approximately $44 per acre more than nonscenic ranches, whereas during the 1979–83 time
period the difference in price per acre was $58. This may have resulted from investors from
outside Wyoming buying Wyoming scenic ranches with little consideration for productivity
during the 1979–83 period. This practice continues; however, indications are that scenic
ranches do not command the premium today as they did during the 1979–83 period.
Using both the 128 ranch sales for the 1979–83 period and the 130 ranch sales for the
1989–93 period, it is observed that the value of public grazing leases varied across type of
leases and across ecological regions and type of terrain. BLM Section 3 leases
consistently had higher annual permit values ($1.96) than Section 15 BLM leases which
appeared to have little, if any, permit value. Forest Service leases, however, appear to have
higher annualized permit values of $5.98 per AUM. Further, both BLM and Forest
Service permit values fell from the 1979–83 period to the later 1989–93 period. State of
Wyoming grazing leases had no estimated annual permit value.14 All lease permit values
varied considerably across the two ecological regions as well as for different ranch terrain
as measured by recreational and/or scenic qualities. Thus, this study, as was the case for
Sunderman and Spahr (1994), recommends that public grazing fees vary according to the
type of lease, the ecological region and terrain. The current single fee charged by the
BLM, Forest Service and State of Wyoming per AUM appears to be very unfair to BLM
Section 15 leaseholders and perhaps a bargain for current Section 3 BLM and Forest
Service leaseholders. Thus, the results of this study suggest that the previous USDA/
USDI (1993) study recommending a single grazing fee is in error. We recommend that
public policymakers adopt a variable-fee policy.
The current controversy regarding the use of federal public lands has involved
individuals and special interest groups from across the country; whereas, 99.1% of the
total federally owned BLM land in the forty-eight contiguous states is found in eleven
western states. Further, in these eleven states the percent of federally owned land ranges
from 29% to 86% (in Wyoming more than 60% of the state consists of public land). Thus,
any changes in policy with regard to the use of these lands will signiﬁcantly impact these
eleven states to the exclusion of most other states. The federal government may reduce
the political impact of its landownership in western states by turning over the
administration or outright deed federal properties to the states in which the lands are
located. Thus, by deeding federal lands with little scenic or recreational value, where the
highest and best use is likely limited to grazing, to the states in which the land is located
or, at a minimum, allowing the individual states to administer these lands, will cause little
loss of potential use of these lands and simultaneously place economic control of these
lands back into the hands of the individual states.
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either sold or deeded to the states and those lands that did possess recreation and/or
scenic values were turned over to the Forest Service, the BLM could be eliminated.
Notes




5Ranch sales are from Albany, Carbon, Converse, Johnson, and Natrona Counties in Wyoming.
6A description of the variables used in this paper is provided in Exhibit 3.
7For example see Sunderman and Spahr (1994), Collins (1983), Winter and Whittaker (1981), and
Martin and Jefferies (1966).
8Thompson (1988) and Torell and Fowler (1986) found that prices of ranches were increasing.
Vanvig and Gleason (1988) found that this also applies to Wyoming.
9Alternative approaches were considered for controlling for the date of sale. One approach is to
perform a separate regression for each of the years during which ranch sales took place. A
combined model is then estimated using implied prices for each of the ranch characteristics across
the four different regressions. This approach will provide demand curves for BLM grazing in four
different markets. This approach requires that a sufﬁcient quantity of data exists for each year of
the study to allow reasonable degrees of freedom for each of the four regressions. Given the size of
the sample, the authors determined that additional methods of controlling for the date of sale are
unwarranted.
10These values are the average of the coefﬁcients for both Model 1 and 2.
11This capitalization rate is consistent with studies by Workman (1988), Gardner (1963) and Torell
and Doll (1991). This is a real rate where inﬂation would effect both the nominal lease fee and the
expected beneﬁt equally.
12To determine the forage value of a lease, add the permit value to the expected lease rate.
13For a discussion of variance inﬂation factors, see Neter et al. (1983).
14Annualized permit values were determined by using a real discount rate of 3.22% to capitalize
these values paid for BLM, Forest Service and State of Wyoming grazing leases.
References
Bryan, T. B. and P. F. Colwell, Housing Price Indexes, in C. F. Sirmans, editor, Research in Real
Estate, 57–84, Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, 1982.
Collins, A. R., A Ranch Land Price Model for Wyoming, University of Wyoming, Agricultural
Experiment Station, SM 44, May 1983.
—— and G. Constantino, Fair Grazing Fees on Public Lands, Rangelands, 1990, 12:5, 278–81.
Gardner, B. D., A Proposal to Reduce Misallocation of Livestock Grazing Permits, Journal of Farm
Economics, 1963, 45, 109–20.
Hooper, J. F., Potential for Increases in Grazing Fees, Journal of Range Management, 1967, 20:5,
300–304.
Lambert, D. K., Ranch Values and the Federal Grazing Fee, Journal of Range Management, 1987,
40:5, 397–400.
Martin, W. E. and G. L. Jefferies, Relating Ranch Prices and Grazing Permit Values to Ranch
Productivity, Journal of Farm Economics, 1966, 48:2, 233–42.
GOVERNMENT GRAZING LEASES, RANCH VALUES 615McCarl, B. A. and R. F. Brokken, An Economic Analysis of Alternative Grazing Fee Systems,
American Journal of Agriculture Economics, 1985, 67, 769–78.
Neter, J., W. Wassserman and M. H. Kutner, Applied Linear Regression Models, Homewood, Ill.:
Irwin, 1983.
Nielsen, D. B., Economic Implications of Variable Versus Single Grazing Fees, Journal of Range
Management, 1972, 25, 2–6.
Obermiller, F. W. and D. K. Lambert, Costs Incurred by Permittees in Grazing Livestock on Public
Lands in Various Western States, Oregon State University Extension Service, EM 8283, 1984.
Roberts, N. K., Economic Foundations for Grazing Use Fees on Public Lands, Journal of Farm
Economics, 1963, 45:4, 721–31.
Rowan, R. C. and J. P. Workman, Factors Affecting Utah Ranch Prices, Journal of Range
Management, 1992, 45:3, 263–66.
Spahr, R. W., M. A. Sunderman and D. O. Jones, The Homogeneity of Government Grazing
Leases and the Attributes for Ranch Values, presented at the American Real Estate Society,
Tenth Annual Meeting, Santa Barbara, California, April 5, 1994.
Sunderman, M. A. and R. W. Spahr, Valuation of Government Grazing Leases, Journal of Real
Estate Research, 1994, 9:2, 179–96.
Thompson, C. K., Appraising Livestock Ranches in a Declining Market, Appraisal Journal, 1988,
56:3, 367–74.
Torell, L. A. and J. P. Doll, Public Land Policy and the Value of Grazing Permits, Western Journal
of Agricultural Economics, 1991, 16:1, 174–84.
Torell, L. A. and J. M. Fowler, The Impact of Public Land Grazing Fees on New Mexico Ranch
Values, Journal of the American Society of Farm Managers and Rural Appraisers, 1986, 50:2,
51–55.
Torell, L. A., J. R. Garrett and C. T. K. Ching, The Economic Effects of Three Changes in Public
Lands Grazing Policies, Journal of Range Management, 1981, 34:5, 373–76.
U.S. Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, U.S. Department of Interior, Bureau of Land
Management (USDA/USDI), Grazing Fee Review and Evaluation Final Report, Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Ofﬁce, June 1986.
——, Incentive Based Grazing Fee System, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Ofﬁce,
August 1993.
U.S. General Accounting Ofﬁce (GOA), Rangeland Management: Proﬁle of the Bureau of Land
Management’s Grazing Allotments and Permits, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Ofﬁce, June 1992.
Vanvig, A. and S. V. Gleason, Wyoming Farm/Ranch Land Market: 1986–1988, University of
Wyoming, Agricultural Experiment Station, RJ 209, August 1988.
Winter, J. R. and J. K. Whittaker, The Relationship Between Private Ranchland Prices and Public-
Land Grazing Permits, Land Economics, 1981, 57:3, 414–21.
Workman, J. P., Federal Grazing Fees: A Controversy That Won’t Go Away, Rangelands, 1988,
10:3, 128–30.
616 THE JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE RESEARCH
VOLUME 10, NUMBER 5, 1995